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JUDICIAL EVASION AND DISINGENUOUS
LEGISLATIVE APPEALS TO SCIENCE IN
THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY
Caitlin E. Borgmann*
INTRODUCTION
As John Rawls proclaimed, ―Justice is the first virtue of social
institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.‖1 Justice and truth
are pillars of the good society, and the courts play a vital role in
ensuring both. The courts‘ primary responsibility is for the norms
of justice, but implementing justice depends upon factual truth.
Laws founded upon untruths subvert justice. Thus, when courts
address laws that implicate individual rights like the right to
abortion, they must ensure that these laws are based on a sound
factual foundation. In the abortion context, the Supreme Court has
increasingly shirked its duty to ensure both justice and truth. First,
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court undermined the
fundamental right to abortion by inviting laws premised on moral
opposition to abortion. Yet its decision was dishonest, denying the
conflict it created and purporting to leave the right to abortion
intact; the decision has thus caused mischief and confusion in
abortion regulation. 2 Second, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court
shunned its responsibility for truth, signaling its readiness to grant
extraordinary deference to disingenuous legislative attempts to
* Associate Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. B.A., Yale
University; J.D., New York University School of Law. I am grateful for the
opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at the Brooklyn Law
School Symposium, ―The ‗Partial-Birth Abortion‘ Ban: Health Care in the
Shadow of Criminal Liability.‖
1
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (revised ed. 1999).
2
See infra notes 75–85 and accompanying text.
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present morally based abortion restrictions as grounded in science. 3
Casey‘s muddled constitutional standard for abortion
regulation has helped to subvert the integrity of legislative
factfinding on abortion. Legislatures historically have sought to
regulate abortion for reasons of ideology, not medicine. 4 Under
Roe v. Wade, this was not permissible, at least before viability. 5
The framework set forth in Roe allowed the state to restrict previability abortions only in order to further the woman‘s health. In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 6 the Court explicitly sanctioned the
state‘s reliance on morality as the basis for abortion regulation. 7
Yet the decision, which upheld a woman‘s right to abortion, placed
limits on how the state could express or implement its preference
for childbirth. Accepting Casey‘s invitation, legislatures have
enacted a wide variety of restrictions based on moral opposition to
abortion. But, partly in response to the confusing legal standard set
forth in Casey, they have felt compelled to disguise these moral
viewpoints as scientific fact.
The controversial nature of abortion, and the close tie between
abortion regulation and the social movement against abortion
rights amplify the unreliability of legislative factfinding on
abortion issues. Since Roe v. Wade, opponents of the right to
abortion have struggled to identify the most effective strategy for
reigniting the public debate and winning over the hearts and minds
of voters. The movement has sometimes determined that the right
to abortion is best attacked indirectly and even deceptively. 8 As the
3

See infra notes 48–70 and accompanying text.
See generally JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE
AMERICAN ABORTION WAR 8–20 (1998); see also Robert Post, Informed
Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician
Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 940–41 (discussing specifically ―informed
consent‖ laws); Letter from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson to ―Whom It
May Concern‖ (Aug. 7, 2007) (on file with the author).
5
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
6
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
7
See id. at 876–78.
8
See, e.g., Letter from Samuel B. Casey & Harold J. Cassidy to Members
of the South Dakota Pro-Life Leadership Coalition at 2–3, 13 (Oct. 10, 2007)
(on file with author). See generally Reva Siegel, The Right‟s Reasons, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1641 (2008) (describing evolution of anti-abortion movement strategy post4
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social movement against abortion has evolved, legislation and
legislative factfinding have mirrored its trajectory, often serving as
the vehicle by which the movement implements its strategy.
Gonzales v. Carhart (―Carhart II‖) only encourages this troubling
trend.9 In Carhart II, the Court broke with its longstanding
abortion precedents and gave broad deference to legislative
factfinding on abortion.10
As I have argued elsewhere, judicial deference to legislative
factfinding is problematic, especially where important individual
rights are at stake.11 This concern is sharply evident in the abortion
context. When courts defer to legislative factfinding on abortion,
what results is an elaborate charade. Legislatures enact laws based
on moral positions about pregnant women or the status of the
embryo or fetus. Rather than make these moral underpinnings
explicit, however, they present abortion restrictions as medical or
health regulations. They then amass questionable legislative
records to support these manufactured medical or health concerns.
Recently, the Eighth Circuit joined the Supreme Court in deferring
to such legislative factfinding.12
In this Article, I discuss and critique legislative factfinding in
the context of so-called ―informed consent‖ legislation, fetal pain
laws, and ―partial-birth abortion‖ bans. I argue that courts neglect
their responsibility for justice and truth when they defer to biased
and unreliable legislative factfinding on abortion. The Article
proceeds in two Parts. In Part I, I examine judicial deference to
legislative factfinding, both generally and in the abortion context
specifically. In Part I.A., I review the traditional justifications for
judicial deference to legislative factfinding. In Part I.B., I describe
the courts‘ historical treatment of legislative factfinding on
abortion and argue that the Supreme Court‘s deference to
congressional factfinding in Carhart II marked a dramatic
Roe).
9

See infra text accompanying notes 49–71.
See infra text accompanying notes 51–58.
11
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative
Factfinding, 84 IND. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2008).
12
Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 2008) (en
banc). See infra Part II.B.
10
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departure from past precedent.
Part II addresses the problematic nature of legislative
factfinding in the abortion context. In Part II.A., I argue that
Casey‘s formulation of the constitutional framework for abortion
regulation has sown confusion and contributed to legislatures‘
tendency to disguise morally based abortion regulations as resting
on science. In Parts II.B., C., and D., I discuss how ―informed
consent‖ laws, fetal pain measures, and ―partial-birth abortion‖
bans, respectively, are disingenuously presented as justified and
even motivated by science. I also criticize the courts for accepting
and encouraging these insincere legislative appeals to science. I
conclude the Article by arguing that courts should approach
legislative factfinding on abortion with caution and skepticism, and
that their duty to ensure justice in the abortion context carries with
it a responsibility to seek the truth underlying abortion regulations.
I. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATIVE FACTFINDING
A. Justifications for Judicial Deference
In discussing legislative factfinding on abortion, I refer to a
particular category of facts commonly called ―legislative‖ or
―social‖ facts. Donald Horowitz has defined social facts as ―the
recurrent patterns of behavior on which social policy must be
based.‖13 Social facts stand in contrast to ―adjudicative‖ or
―historical‖ facts, which are the facts particular to the litigants and
dispute before a court.14 When legislatures conduct factfinding in
connection with proposed legislation, they examine social facts.
Social facts overlap, but are not synonymous, with policy
judgments. It is often said that courts should defer to legislative
factfinding because legislatures are the appropriate institutions for
policymaking. But even if legislatures should generally be solely
responsible for making policy, this does not address the question of
which institution should have the final say in determining the facts
13

See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45 (1977).
See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 43–62 (2008) (discussing fact classification and
providing a taxonomy of constitutional facts).
14
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relevant to those policy choices. 15 Another common but mistaken
assumption is that deference to legislative factfinding tracks the
levels of scrutiny applied in constitutional decisionmaking. Thus,
many assume, courts applying rational basis review are highly
deferential to legislative factfinding whereas, when applying strict
scrutiny, courts independently review the facts.16 But the courts
have not consistently followed this pattern and have sometimes
deferred when strict or heightened scrutiny applies, and sometimes
declined to defer where rational basis applies. 17 Moreover,
although the questions are related, how much deference to accord a
legislature‘s factfinding is a distinct question from which legal
standard to apply to the facts.18
Although the Supreme Court‘s treatment of legislative
factfinding is confused and incoherent, a recurring theme in the
Court‘s decisions is that courts should defer to factfinding by
Congress and state legislatures.19 This principle of judicial
deference stems from two concerns. 20 The first is a concern for
institutional legitimacy and separation of powers. Because
legislatures are the institutions invested with the authority to make
policy, the Court has sometimes suggested that legislatures retain
authority to decide the underlying facts as well. 21 Thus, for
15

See Borgmann, supra note 11, at text accompanying note 43.
See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 333 (1993) (stating that under
rational basis review, courts must defer to factual assumptions underlying
legislative rationale, even if they are erroneous); Indiana Democratic Party v.
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 844 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (suggesting that court‘s
refusal to apply strict scrutiny to state voter identification law meant that court
could not question state‘s factual justifications for the law (citing FCC v. Beach
Commc‘ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)), aff‟d sub nom., Crawford v. Marion
County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (2007); Am. Subcontractors Ass‘n v. City of
Atlanta, 259 Ga. 14, 17 (1989).
17
See Borgmann, supra note 11, at __ (citing cases).
18
See id.
19
See generally Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference,
Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941 (1999) (reviewing
history of judicial deference).
20
See Borgmann, supra note 11, at __ (discussing justifications for judicial
deference to legislative factfinding).
21
See HOROWITZ, supra note 13, at 25–26, 28–29; Saul M. Pilchen,
16
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example, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court
asserted:
We owe Congress‘ findings an additional measure of
deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the
legislative power. Even in the realm of First Amendment
questions where Congress must base its conclusions upon
substantial evidence, deference must be accorded to its
findings as to the harm to be avoided and to the remedial
measures adopted for that end, lest we infringe on
traditional legislative authority to make predictive
judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy. 22
Judicial deference to legislative factfinding is also defended on
the ground that legislatures possess greater capacity, or
competence, in factfinding as compared with the courts.23
Legislatures can draw on a broader range of resources, including
the subpoena power and informal sources of information. They are
more diverse than the judiciary and represent a broader array of
viewpoints and backgrounds, thus fostering a better understanding
of the social circumstances requiring legislative solutions. Because
they control their own agenda, they are not reactive in the way
courts are and can take a broader view of a given social issue. In
Congress particularly, legislators can specialize, thus bringing
individual expertise to bear in certain contexts, whereas judges
Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to
Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 337, 365 (1984); see also Borgmann, supra note 11, at __
(summarizing arguments); B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make
Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV 277,
282 (2007) (same).
22
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997) (Turner II)
(emphasis added). The ―harm to be avoided‖ is a factual inquiry whereas the
―remedial measures‖ are a policy choice; in Turner II, the Court advocated
deferring to both.
23
See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial
Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1177–79 (2001);
HOROWITZ, supra note 13, at 25–26, 28–29; Pilchen, supra note 21, at 365;
Solove, supra note 19, at 1005–06; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 68 (1999); see also Borgmann, supra
note 11, at __ (summarizing arguments); Hill, supra note 21, at 282 (same).
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tend to be generalists.
Neither institutional concerns nor relative competence support
judicial deference to factfinding in the abortion context.24
Legislatures seeking to pass abortion restrictions do so for political
and ideological reasons, reasons formed prior to any related
factfinding and unlikely to be swayed by exposure to
countervailing facts. Far from lacking institutional authority to
review facts independently in such cases, the courts play an
important constitutional role as a protector of individual rights
from the tyranny of the majority. 25
Moreover, rather than enjoying superior factfinding
competence, the legislative system is an inherently unfavorable
setting for factfinding with integrity. As I have argued,
Superior legislative factfinding competence is a chimera,
especially when a legislature considers a proposal that will
restrict individual rights in a controversial context. The
problem is multi-layered. At the first level lie significant
structural issues. Legislators are subject to political
pressures beyond their control that are markedly different
from those faced by courts, and these pressures profoundly
affect the nature of legislative factfinding. The second level
of difficulty is legislatures‘ frequent failure to seize
whatever opportunities and advantages they do possess to
conduct dispassionate and rigorous factfinding. Finally, the
combination of these two problems impairs legislators‘
cognitive judgment, engendering mistakes in evaluating
facts. Legislatures take non-facts for facts, or they dwell on
24

For a fuller critique of the principle of judicial deference to legislative
factfinding in the context of individual rights, see Borgmann, supra note 11, at
Part III.
25
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 68 (1980); see also FAIGMAN, supra note 14, at 175–76; Caitlin E.
Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and Constitutional Accountability, 79 S. CAL.
L. REV. 753, 801 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for
Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1706–08 (2008); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. Federal Judiciary,
85 NEB. L. REV. 1, 13 (2006); Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (reviewing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005)).
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insignificant facts. These tendencies are exacerbated when
legislators consider hot-button social issues . . . . Courts of
course face their own obstacles in evaluating facts, and
their factfinding is far from perfect. But in important cases
they have proven to do a better job than the legislatures,
justifying a reevaluation of deference to legislative
factfinding in these contexts.26
B. Courts‟ Treatment of Legislative Factfinding in the Abortion
Context

Until very recently, courts have not deferred to legislative
factfinding in abortion cases.27 Rather, they have independently
reviewed the relevant medical and other social facts implicated by
abortion legislation. For example, just three years after Roe, in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,28 the Court addressed a Missouri
statute banning the saline amniocentesis method of abortion. The
statute included a legislative finding that the method was
―deleterious to maternal health.‖29 Rather than defer to this finding,
the Court independently reviewed the facts and found that the
safest alternative method—prostaglandin induction—was not
readily available. Because saline amniocentesis was, at the time,
the most common method of second-trimester abortions, the Court
concluded it could not be banned. 30
In Akron v. Akron Reproductive Health Services,31 the Court
likewise refused to defer to the factfinding underlying challenged

26

Borgmann, supra note 11, at __ (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of
the conditions that lead to biased factfinding in legislatures, see DAVID R.
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); Laycock, supra
note 25, at 1174–75.
27
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v.
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Akron v. Akron Reprod. Health
Servs., 462 U.S. 416, 434–37 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 76–79 (1976).
28
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75–76.
29
Id. at 58.
30
Id. at 78–79.
31
Akron, 462 U.S. at 434–37.
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abortion restrictions. Akron involved an ordinance that set forth a
number of restrictions, including requirements for a mandatory
delay and so-called ―informed consent,‖ hospitalization for all
abortions performed after the first trimester, and either parental
notice or parental consent for minors (depending on their age). 32
The ordinance contained several ―findings‖ that mixed medical
assertions—including that abortion is ―a major surgical procedure‖
that should be performed only in a ―hospital or in such other
special outpatient facility offering the maximum safeguards to the
life and health of the pregnant woman‖ 33—with moral views—that
―there is no point in time between the union of sperm and egg, or
at least the blastocyst stage and the birth of the infant at which
point we can say the unborn child is not a human life.‖34
The Court cautioned that, while the state was permitted to
regulate abortion in order to promote women‘s health, ―[t]he
State‘s discretion . . . does not, however, permit it to adopt abortion
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice.‖ 35 Thus,
the Court declined to defer to Akron‘s finding that a hospitalization
requirement promoted women‘s health. Instead, the Court
reviewed evidence regarding the safety and availability of new
abortion procedures, as well as professional opinions regarding
hospitalization for abortion.36 The Court also examined the cost to
patients of hospital abortions as compared with those performed in
outpatient facilities.37
Not all of the Justices agreed with the Court‘s failure to defer
to the government‘s factfinding. Justice O‘Connor, in a dissenting
opinion, at first seemed to acknowledge the inherent difficulties in
legislative regulation of the details of medical practice. She
suggested that it was unrealistic to expect that legislatures could
―continuously and conscientiously study contemporary medical
and scientific literature in order to determine whether the effect of
a particular regulation is to ‗depart from accepted medical practice‘
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id.
Id. at 421 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 431.
Id.
See id. at 434–35.
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insofar as particular procedures and particular periods within the
trimester are concerned.‖ 38 Nevertheless, she argued for deference
to legislatures‘ factfinding on abortion, asserting, ―Irrespective of
the difficulty of the task, legislatures, with their superior
factfinding capabilities, are certainly better able to make the
necessary judgments than are courts.‖39
Despite O‘Connor‘s admonition, the Court continued to ignore
legislative factfinding in subsequent abortion cases. In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,40 the legislature had included, in an
omnibus abortion bill, a ―finding‖ that ―[t]he life of each human
being begins at conception.‖41 Far from deferring to this finding,
the Court interpreted it to have no effect, noting that ―the preamble
does not by its terms regulate abortion or any other aspect of
appellees‘ medical practice‖ and concluding that it be ―read simply
to express [a] value judgment‖ favoring childbirth over abortion. 42
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court wholly disregarded
any legislative factfinding and instead reviewed the district court‘s
findings concerning the effects of several challenged provisions
including ―informed consent,‖ husband notification for married
women, and parental consent for minors. 43 The Court‘s deference
to the district court‘s findings of fact on these provisions was
admittedly uneven. It seemed to take seriously only the district
court‘s findings on the effect of the husband notification provision,
repeating in detail evidence of the social problem of family
violence. 44 It was less impressed with the district court‘s findings
of fact on ―informed consent.‖ Yet even there, the Court purported
to accept the district court‘s finding that the provision could result
in delays and increased health risks to the woman and nowhere
38

Id. at 456 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 456 n.4 (emphasis added).
40
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
41
Id. at 504 (referencing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986)).
42
Webster, 492 U.S. at 506.
43
See 505 U.S. at 881–99.
44
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights
After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 678–700 (2004)
(comparing Court‘s treatment of district court‘s factfinding on the various
provisions challenged in Casey).
39
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deferred to stated or implicit legislative findings regarding the
provision‘s effects. Instead, the Court differed with the district
court on the legal significance of its findings, concluding that the
statute‘s predicted effects did not amount to an ―undue burden.‖45
Similarly, although the Court in Casey did not even mention
the district court‘s findings regarding the harmful effects of the
parental consent provision, it upheld the provision not out of
deference to the legislature‘s understanding of the facts, but rather
because the Court had previously held such provisions to be
permissible under Roe.46 Those earlier decisions themselves were
based, not on deference to state legislatures, but on minimal
factfinding by the district courts and, primarily, by a constitutional
analysis that weighed a minor‘s right to end her pregnancy against
countervailing interests including ―the importance of the parental
role in child rearing.‖47
The Court continued to disregard legislative factfinding in its
2000 decision in Stenberg v. Carhart (―Carhart I‖),48 invalidating
Nebraska‘s ban on so-called ―partial birth abortion.‖ In Carhart I,
the trial court, Eighth Circuit, and Supreme Court all
independently reviewed the facts underlying Nebraska‘s ―partialbirth abortion‖ ban and did not even consider deferring to state
legislative factfinding. 49 But the Court‘s decision in Carhart II50
marked a sharp change in its approach to legislative factfinding on
abortion. In Carhart II, the Court credited dubious legislative
factual assertions in order to justify a largely incoherent decision.

45

505 U.S. at 886.
See id. at 899.
47
See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
48
530 U.S. 914 (2000).
49
See id. at 923–30; Stenberg v. Carhart, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999);
Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1997). Similarly, courts
considering the many other challenged state bans independently determined the
facts without deferring to the legislatures. See, e.g., R.I. Med. Soc‘y v.
Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 295 (D.R.I. 1999), aff‟d, 239 F.3d 104 (1st Cir.
2001); Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Miller, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (S.D. Iowa
1998), aff‟d, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d
1024 (W.D. Ky. 1998), aff‟d, 224 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2000).
50
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
46
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In Carhart II, the Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a ban nearly identical to the Nebraska
ban struck down in Carhart I.51 Congress had attempted to
distinguish its ban from the now-invalid state bans in part by
inserting formal congressional findings into the statute. These
findings included detailed assertions that the targeted procedure
was ―not only unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, but
in fact pose[d] serious risks to the long-term health of women and
in some circumstances, their lives.‖52 The findings also claimed
that the procedure was a rogue method disfavored among abortion
providers and not taught in medical schools. 53 The government
argued that the courts owed these findings deference.
The Supreme Court‘s opinion first acknowledged the
importance of judicial deference and, in the next breath,
proclaimed its duty to review the facts independently because a
―constitutional right‖ was at issue. 54 Then, despite the
demonstrably poor quality of Congress‘s factfinding, 55 the Court
implicitly deferred to Congress on the issue of whether the ban
needed a health exception. The Court gave sufficient credit to
Congress‘s factfinding to hold that there was medical disagreement
as to the risks and benefits of the targeted abortion technique. 56
51

See id. at 1619.
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000).
53
Id. (stating that the targeted method is a ―disfavored procedure‖ that is
―outside the standard of medical care‖).
54
See 127 S. Ct. at 1637 (asserting that ―we review congressional
factfinding under a deferential standard‖ but that ―[t]he Court retains an
independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional
rights are at stake‖).
55
See Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1019 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (―[T]he oral testimony before Congress was not only unbalanced, but
intentionally polemic.‖); Brief of 52 Members of Congress as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood; Gonzales v. Carhart,
127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 05-380), 2006 WL 2736635, at 9–10
(arguing that congressional ―findings‖ in the federal ban were drafted by the
majority before additional hearings were held, and the subsequent testimony
―was politically biased and transparently partisan, calculated to highlight
testimony from supporters of the ban‖).
56
See 127 S. Ct. at 1636.
52
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Given this purported disagreement, the Court sided with Congress,
determining that a health exception was not needed to render the
act constitutional on its face:
Considerations of marginal safety, including the balance of
risks, are within the legislative competence when the
regulation is rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends . . . .
The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty
over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to
preserve a woman‘s health, given the availability of other
abortion procedures that are considered to be safe
alternatives. 57
As David Faigman observes:
In truth . . . this so-called medical disagreement was on the
level of such scientific disagreements as evolution versus
intelligent design and the reality of global warming. All
three lower district courts agreed that there was, at least, ―a
significant body of medical opinion‖ that the absence of a
health exception carried significant health risks. The
―scientific‖ debate over this procedure was largely
manufactured by Congress, which had held highly partisan
hearings on the subject and then concluded that a health
exception was not necessary. Nonetheless, [Justice]
Kennedy relied on this ―uncertainty‖ to support his
conclusion that ―the Act can survive this facial attack.‖58
In a dramatically dishonest portion of the opinion, the Court
went out of its way to signal its approval of broad moral positions
promoted by the anti-abortion movement, even as it pretended
merely to articulate common-sense reasons for its relatively narrow
ruling in the case before it. In an opinion supposedly addressing
how abortions may be carried out, the Court suddenly waxed
nostalgic about motherhood, proclaiming, ―Respect for human life
57

Id. at 1638; see also id. at 1637 (―Medical uncertainty does not foreclose
the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in
other contexts. The medical uncertainty over whether the Act‘s prohibition
creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this
facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue burden.‖ (citation omitted)).
58
FAIGMAN, supra note 14, at 60.
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finds its ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for
her child.‖59 Attempting to tie this moral statement to the
regulation of abortion, the Court implied that a woman‘s right to
information was somehow at stake in the case. It suggested that the
ban would protect a woman from a painful decision that she would
later regret and stressed that it was important for women to be
informed of ―the way in which the fetus will be killed.‖ 60 The
passage seemed clearly intended to signal to legislatures the
Court‘s willingness to accept future ―informed consent‖ legislation
premised on the dubious factual claim that women experience
emotional trauma following abortions. 61
The Court seemed not to care that medical authority had
debunked the theory of a ―post-abortion syndrome,‖62 blithely
admitting that ―we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon‖ of post-abortion mental trauma. 63 Further, it seemed
to forget that the case was not about information but about whether
a certain method could be banned altogether, so that a woman
would never have access to it, much less hear a description of it.
Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent condemned the Court‘s awkward
invocation of ―an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly
has no reliable evidence‖ to support a moral position ―that could
yield prohibitions on any abortion.‖ 64
Particularly noteworthy was the Court‘s reliance on an amicus
brief containing testimonials against abortion that were also cited
59

127 S. Ct. at 1634.
Id.
61
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit recently issued an en banc ruling that was
clearly influenced by the Supreme Court‘s acceptance of the mental trauma
claim, quoting the Court‘s entire passage in its opinion. Planned Parenthood v.
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008). See infra Part II.B.
62
See 127 S. Ct. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Post, supra note 4, at
962–63. In fairness, the controlling opinion in Casey had also suggested that
mental trauma might result from abortion if the woman were not ―fully
informed.‖ 505 U.S. at 882; see also Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting
Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain
Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 122, 122 & n.66 (2008). The Court did not
cite a source for this statement in Casey.
63
127 S. Ct. at 1634.
64
Id. at 1647–48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60
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by a legislatively appointed, highly partisan South Dakota task
force.65 The South Dakota legislature relied on the task force‘s
factual findings in enacting a complete ban on abortions in South
Dakota.66 Two anti-abortion lawyers who were architects of the
South Dakota strategy acknowledged an implicit conversation
between the South Dakota law‘s advocates and the Court on this
point. They wrote that the South Dakota law and its defense in
federal court have ―been litigated with an eye towards Justice
Kennedy‖ (the author of the majority opinion in Carhart II) and
that ―[i]t was not a coincidence that Justice Kennedy cited to [an
amicus brief] which related the experiences of post-abortive
women.‖67
At a more general level, the majority opinion in Carhart II
vividly displays the Court‘s complicity in factual gamesmanship
by legislatures addressing abortion. The Court began its legal
analysis by declaring that its central task was to ―determine
whether the Act furthers the legitimate interest of the Government
in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child.‖68 But
because a law that purports only to ban a single (and allegedly
unnecessary) method of abortion can in no measure be said to
―protect the life of the fetus,‖ the Court was forced to emulate
Congress‘s contorted attempts to make the foot fit the slipper. The
Court explained that the Act protected fetal dignity by fending off
a ―coarsening‖ of the culture that would lead to widespread
indifference to the lives of newborns and ―all vulnerable and
innocent human life.‖69 The Act allegedly promoted this goal by
―proscrib[ing] a method of abortion in which a fetus is killed just
65

See Siegel, supra note 8, at 1642–43; Post, supra note 4, at 966–68.
S.D. HB 1215 (2006) (―[T]he Legislature finds, based upon the
conclusions of the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, . . . [that]
abortions in South Dakota should be prohibited.‖). The ban contained only a
limited death exception for the woman. See id. It was ultimately repealed by
voters. See Kaiser Daily Women‘s Health Policy Report, South Dakota Voters
Reject State Abortion Ban (Nov. 8, 2006), available at http://www.kaiser
network.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=40932.
67
Casey & Cassidy, supra note 8, at 10, 12.
68
Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1626.
69
Id. at 1633 (quoting congressional findings).
66
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inches before completion of the birth process.‖70
This suggestion that the abortions at issue entailed killing fullterm babies about to be born was an utter falsehood. As the Court
itself noted, the district court‘s injunction against the ban did not
apply to fetuses who were viable (let alone to fetuses in the midst
of being born).71 Justice Ginsburg bemoaned the Court‘s
chicanery:
Ultimately, the Court admits that ―moral concerns‖ are at
work, concerns that could yield prohibitions on any
abortion. Notably, the concerns expressed are untethered to
any ground genuinely serving the Government‘s interest in
preserving life. By allowing such concerns to carry the day
and case, overriding fundamental rights, the Court
dishonors our precedent.72
Thus, in Carhart II, the Court was complicit in injustice in two
ways. It failed to acknowledge how the limited ―moral concerns‖
Congress set forth in fact subverted the fundamental norm of
protecting the right to abortion set forth in Casey and reaffirmed in
Carhart I. Second, it shirked its duty to identify a sound factual
basis for the law, accepting and echoing patently false assertions
about the motives for the Act and about its medical implications.
II. LEGISLATIVE FACTFINDING IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT
A. The Problematic Nature of Legislative Factfinding in
Abortion Regulation
Legislatures are by their very nature prone to conduct
tendentious, and therefore unreliable, factfinding to support
proposed legislation.73 This tendency can be exacerbated by
judicial deference to legislative factfinding, since legislatures who
70

Id. at 1632–33 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1619 (―In 2004, after a 2-week trial, the District Court granted
a permanent injunction that prohibited the Attorney General from enforcing the
Act in all cases but those in which there was no dispute the fetus was viable. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.‖ (citation omitted)).
72
Id. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
73
Borgmann, supra note 11.
71
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expect that courts will defer to their factual findings will often try
to package rights-limiting moral positions as factual claims. 74 In
the abortion context, the likelihood of unreliable factfinding is
especially acute. Legislatures eager to pass abortion restrictions not
only ignore countervailing facts, but both the Casey standard and
the evolving strategy of the anti-abortion movement have led
legislatures to design abortion laws that conceal their true purpose
and then to embark on ―factfinding‖ that skirts the ideological
basis for the laws.
The unique nature of pregnancy and how the Casey Court
formulated the constitutional standard for abortion regulation has
likely contributed to the legislative propensity to present abortion
restrictions as scientifically based. Nearly all abortion restrictions
are, at bottom, driven by morality rather than science. 75 But the
Court‘s abortion decisions have sown confusion about how
explicitly the government can base abortion regulations on purely
moral underpinnings. The test that Casey established, on the one
hand, endorsed states‘ taking a stance in the moral debate and
conveying their stance to women. On the other, it seemed to
require adherence to some sort of standard of truth and accuracy
more suited to factual assertions than to moral opinions. More
fundamentally, it affirmed the constitutional right to abortion,
which is squarely at odds with morally based laws designed to
limit or ban abortion.

74

See id. at __ (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927)
(deferring in part to ―the general declarations of the legislature‖ in finding that
societal welfare would be promoted by sterilizing ―mental defectives‖); Suzanne
B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and
Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1965 (2006) (using Buck
v. Bell to demonstrate the normative judgments underlying many ―factual‖
assertions by courts)); see also, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (including
―findings‖ that ―the life of each human being begins at conception‖; that
―[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being‖; and
that ―[t]he natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the
life, health, and well-being of their unborn child‖).
75
See generally RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 4; see also Bopp & Coleson,
supra note 4; Post, supra note 4, at 940–41 (discussing ―informed consent‖
laws).
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In Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the woman‘s right to
abortion, but it also held that the state‘s interest in the embryo was
compelling from the inception of pregnancy. 76 The Court asserted
that these interests ―do not contradict one another.‖ 77 This, of
course, is nonsense:
The strength of the state‘s interest in fetal welfare is
inversely proportional to that of the woman‘s liberty. The
Court could not expand Roe‘s recognition of the state‘s
interest in the fetus into the pre-viability stage without
placing the woman‘s liberty fundamentally at risk. . . .
Apparently recognizing the hornets‘ nest into which they
had stumbled, the joint opinion‘s authors attempted a fast
exit, adding that ―the means chosen by the State to further
the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the
woman‘s free choice, not hinder it.‖78
Permissible restrictions, the Court explained, were regulations
―not designed to strike at the right itself‖ but those that ―do no
more than create a structural mechanism by which the State . . .
may express profound respect for the life of the unborn.‖79
The Court was deceiving itself if it thought that such a law
could really exist. In fact, there is no meaningful distinction
between a law intended to make abortions harder to obtain and one
intended to promote the state‘s preference for childbirth over
abortion.80 As Justice Scalia pointed out in his Casey dissent, ―Any
regulation of abortion that is intended to advance what the joint
opinion concedes is the State‘s ‗substantial‘ interest in protecting
unborn life will be ‗calculated to hinder‘ a decision to have an
abortion.‖81
76

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
Id.
78
Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights
After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 690–91 (2004) (footnotes
omitted).
79
505 U.S. at 877; see also id. at 878 (―[A] state measure designed to
persuade [women] to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if
reasonably related to that goal‖ and if it does not impose an undue burden.).
80
Borgmann, supra note 78, at 692.
81
505 U.S. at 987 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77
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By recognizing the state‘s interest in the embryo or fetus as
compelling throughout pregnancy, Casey emboldened state
legislatures to pass laws motivated by moral opposition to
abortion. But these legislatures have also been mindful of Casey‘s
caution that such laws may only incidentally burden access to
abortion, and that any mandated information must be ―truthful and
not misleading.‖82 Cautious or uncertain about the extent to which
they can openly profess ideological grounds for abortion laws, the
legislatures instead present abortion restrictions as rooted in
medical and scientific concerns. 83 This juxtaposition of science and
morality is particularly vivid in the context of a recently upheld
South Dakota ―informed consent‖ law. The Eighth Circuit en banc
opinion showed extraordinary deference to the legislature‘s
presentation of moral opinions as scientific fact.84 But even when
restrictions are not about conveying information, legislatures seek
to present them as supported, and even motivated, by science and
medicine. 85
It is not hard to imagine what laws and legislative factfinding
look like when a legislature is forthright about the ethical basis for
a proposed law. If a legislature wants to prevent vandalism to
buildings occupied by religious institutions, it enacts a ban on such
behavior.86 The legislative hearing process is likely dominated by
ethical concerns and presumably acknowledges the bill‘s moral
impetus.87 To the extent the legislature delves into factfinding, it
explores factual questions directly relevant to the law‘s the moral
purposes. It may also use the factfinding process to rally moral
outrage, perhaps by documenting the extent and heinousness of
vandalism targeting religious institutions. Likewise, if a legislature
believed abortions were immoral and openly sought to prevent
them on this basis, its first step would be to propose a ban. In
82

Id. at 882.
Siegel, supra note 8 (describing strategic shifts in social movement
opposing abortion as responsible for abortion restrictions premised on women‘s
emotional and physical well-being).
84
See infra Part II.B.
85
See infra Part II.C.–D.
86
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 594.3 (2008).
87
See id.
83
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support of the ban, it would introduce evidence about the numbers
of abortions and perhaps about the reasons women seek them. It
might also try to demonstrate how effective its legislation would be
in preventing abortions. It might even take a page from the book of
some extreme anti-abortion-rights advocates, showing images of
aborted fetuses or giving other information designed to raise
discomfort over abortion. 88
But Casey and Carhart I and II tell legislatures that they may
not unduly burden access to abortion, so bans are out of the
question. Moreover, even restrictions short of a ban are subject to
Casey‘s admonition that laws may not be ―designed to strike at the
right itself‖89 and may impart only ―truthful, nonmisleading‖
information. 90 It is unclear how this standard applies to laws rooted
in moral opposition to abortion. Consequently, abortion rights
opponents seem to feel obligated to hide the ball on abortion
legislation. 91 Abortion providers are targeted with onerous and
discriminatory facility regulations purportedly in order to
safeguard women‘s health and safety, when in fact the goal is to
force clinics to shut down.92 ―Informed consent‖ regulations are
allegedly designed to protect women‘s mental health, when in fact
they endeavor to trick women through misleading and selective
disclosures into rejecting abortion. 93 Fetal pain measures
supposedly aim to alleviate fetal pain during abortion, when in fact
they are meant to provoke moral outrage against abortion by
88

These kinds of ―facts‖ often still find their way into legislative
factfinding on abortion measures, but in a more cunning, indirect way. See infra
Part II.B.
89
505 U.S. at 877.
90
Id. at 882.
91
It is not Casey alone that has prompted the anti-abortion movement to
repackage moral arguments against abortion as public health arguments. See
Siegel, supra note 8, at 2 (detailing evolution of anti-abortion movement,
including shift from moral arguments about the humanity of the embryo or fetus
to public health arguments centered on abortion‘s alleged harm to women).
92
See Bopp & Coleson supra note 4 (anti-abortion strategy memo,
referring to benefits of ―‗incremental‘ efforts‖ to eliminate abortion, including
―clinic regulations (which often shut down clinics)‖); Casey & Cassidy, supra
note 8, at 7–8.
93
See Post, supra note 4, at 940–41; infra Part II.B.
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equating the fetus with a baby or child. 94 In South Dakota, antiabortion-rights activists are gearing up for the ultimate conflation
of science and morality on the issue of abortion; they intend to
―prove‖ in legislative hearings, through scientific evidence, that a
fetus is a person. They plan to do so first in the context of
defending South Dakota‘s ―informed consent‖ law. 95 But they see
this law as merely a step toward the final goal: ―proving‖ the
humanity of the fetus so that the Supreme Court has no choice but
to overturn Roe.96
B. “Informed Consent” Laws and “Proving” Fetal
Personhood
Casey‘s confusing directive to states on permissible abortion
regulation seems most clearly to contemplate an ―informed
consent‖ law. It seems straightforward enough that, under Casey, a
state may enact a law expressing the state‘s preference for
childbirth. But, of course, a law that requires women to hear
simply that the legislature thinks abortion is immoral and prefers
childbirth would not be very effective. As soon as legislatures
attempt to go beyond such a bland statement, however, they butt
up against Casey‘s ―truthful and not misleading‖ limitation.97
Earlier generations of these laws required abortion providers to
disclose or offer basic, ―neutral‖ information, such as the
gestational age of the fetus and depictions of fetuses at various
anatomical stages.98 Current versions require that women seeking

94

See infra Part II.C.
See Casey & Cassidy, supra note 8, at 8 (predicting that a ―trial on the
humanity of the child will likely take place in 2008‖ following the Eighth
Circuit‘s en banc ruling).
96
See id.; see also ChristianNewsWire, U.S. Appeals Court Decision
Acknowledges
Humanity
of
Unborn
Child
(July
3,
2008),
http://christiannewswire.com/news/657267089.html.
97
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992); see supra text
accompanying notes 75–85.
98
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2008); Akron v. Akron
Reprod. Health Servs., 462 U.S. 416, 423 (1983) (describing ―informed
consent‖ provisions of abortion ordinance).
95
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abortions view, or at least be offered the opportunity to view,
ultrasound images of their fetuses, 99 or they require that doctors
recite blatantly ideological statements on the state‘s behalf. 100
First-generation ―informed consent‖ laws sometimes also
contained moral statements, but these seemed to acknowledge that
positions on abortion are a matter of belief or conviction, not
science. For example, an Illinois law required that doctors give
patients printed materials about abortion that included the
following statement: ―The State of Illinois wants you to know that
in its view the child you are carrying is a living human being
whose life should be preserved. Illinois strongly encourages you
not to have an abortion but to go through to childbirth.‖101 This
pre-Casey provision was invalidated,102 but it is not clear that
Casey would forbid such a requirement as ―misleading.‖ 103 The
law goes slightly beyond a bare recitation of the state‘s preference
by asserting that the embryo or fetus ―is a living human being‖
(and a ―child‖), but it admits that this is the state‘s ―view,‖
suggesting opinions may differ.
The tack recently taken by some legislatures in the current
generation of ―informed consent‖ laws is to present similar moral
―information,‖ but to clothe it in scientific or public health garb. 104
99

See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41330 (2007); see also Daily Women‘s Health Policy Report, S.C. Legislature
Approves Abortion Ultrasound Measure (Apr. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/News2?news_iv_ctrl=-1&abbr=daily2_
&page=NewsArticle&id=11037 (discussing earlier version of South Carolina
bill which required women to view ultrasound).
100
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2008).
101
Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 781 n.13 (7th Cir. 1980) (emphasis
added).
102
Id. at 775 n.2.
103
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
104
See Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 748 (2008) (Murphy,
J., dissenting) (describing South Dakota law as requiring ―vague and ideological
statements disguised as medical information‖); Siegel, supra note 8, at 1673
(describing how anti-abortion activist David Reardon took moral objections to
abortion rooted in ―the language of Christian love‖ and couched them ―as a
concern about women‘s welfare expressed in the language of public health,‖
which would appeal more to ambivalent voters).
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Thus, for example, when the South Dakota legislature enacted an
―informed consent‖ measure, it included in the law a ―finding‖ that
―all abortions, whether surgically or chemically induced, terminate
the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.‖ 105 The
statute required doctors to deliver a similar message to their
abortion patients, namely ―[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life
of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.‖106 While most
would read this as an explicitly moral pronouncement, a South
Dakota task force appointed by the legislature to investigate the
effects of abortion characterized the assertion ―as a matter of
scientific fact.‖107
The South Dakota ―informed consent‖ law was immediately
challenged in federal court.108 One of the plaintiffs‘ claims was
that the statute‘s disclosure requirements violated physicians‘ free
speech rights. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent the statute from taking effect. Following the submission of
evidence (which included facts from the legislative history) and a
hearing, the district court granted the preliminary injunction based
on the physicians‘ free speech claim. 109 A divided panel of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but the court granted a
rehearing en banc. 110
While the en banc ruling was pending, two lawyers and
architects of the South Dakota strategy111 described the Rounds
case as addressing purely ―legal and factual issues,‖ including
women‘s alleged regret after abortion and the ―humanity‖ of the
embryo or fetus. In fact, they predicted, once the Eighth Circuit
issued its en banc ruling, ―a trial on the humanity of the child‖
would follow.112
105

H.B. 1166, 2005 Legis. Assem., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005).
Id.
107
SOUTH DAKOTA T ASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, REPORT OF THE
SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION 5 (2005), available at
http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/Task_Force_Report.pdf.
108
Rounds, 530 F.3d at 724.
109
Rounds, 530 F.3d at 729 (summarizing district court‘s ruling).
110
Id. at 730.
111
See Siegel, supra note 8, at 1646 n.16.
112
Casey & Cassidy, supra note 8, at 7–8.
106
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The Eighth Circuit en banc ruling gave extraordinary deference
to the legislature‘s blatant attempt to package a moral statement
about when life begins as a scientific statement about embryonic
genetics. It was important that the court accept the legislature‘s
characterization of the question as scientific, because it interpreted
Casey and Carhart II to forbid South Dakota to convey a purely
moral viewpoint through physicians. As the court stated the test:
[W]hile the State cannot compel an individual simply to
speak the State‟s ideological message, it can use its
regulatory authority to require a physician to provide
truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient‘s
decision to have an abortion, even if that information might
also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over
abortion.‖113
The court found that the ―informed consent‖ law‘s mandated
disclosure met this test:
Once one accepts that the required disclosure must take
into account the limiting definition in § 8(4), the evidence
submitted by the parties regarding the truthfulness and
relevance of the disclosure in § 7(1)(b) generates little
dispute. The disclosure actually mandated by § 7(1)(b), in
concert with the definition in § 8(4), is ―[t]hat the abortion
will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being,‖ § 7(1)(b), and that ―human being‖ in this
case means ―an individual living member of the species of
Homo sapiens . . . during [its] embryonic [or] fetal age[],‖
§ 8(4).114
The court assured that ―the biological sense in which the embryo
or fetus is whole, separate, unique and living should be clear in
context to a physician‖ and noted that ―Planned Parenthood
submitted no evidence to oppose that conclusion.‖ 115
To accept the South Dakota legislature‘s findings as scientific
fact is to make the absurd suggestion that pregnant women do not
know that the embryo or fetus they are carrying is of the human
113
114
115

Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 736.
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species. 116 There is no other way to interpret the South Dakota
findings on a scientific level—as science, the information
conveyed is laughably obvious and unnecessary. Robert Post
writes, ―It hardly seems plausible that a woman could be confused
about whether she is carrying the biological fetus of a zebra, a
raccoon, or a bat.‖117 If the information were presented with more
scientific detail, it might impart information women do not
typically know, but it still seems unlikely to affect a woman‘s
abortion decision. For example, few women are likely to be
deterred from obtaining abortions simply because they are told:
Although the material messenger RNA initially present in
the fertilized egg can provide the basic functions necessary
to transcribe the [blastocyst‘s] DNA in the initial one or
two cell divisions immediately following fertilization, these
messenger RNAs are quickly degraded and lost after the
first two rounds of cell division, and the housekeeping
genes in the [blastocyst‘s] own DNA are transcribed into
messenger RNA at that point. This newly synthesized RNA
directs the program of global demethylation of genes so
that they can be activated to replenish the functions lost
after the degradation of the maternal RNA. Modern
molecular biology has discovered that by the third cell
division (long before implantation) all control of growth
and development are established by the [blastocyst‘s]
DNA. This means that immediately after conception, all
programming for growth of the [blastocyst] is selfcontained. 118
It is only as a moral statement that the legislature‘s ―findings‖
become significant. The South Dakota legislature has a particular
opinion about the moral significance of the scientific facts that it

116

See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Eighth Circuit to Pregnant Women: You‟re
Not Carrying a Dolphin!, Reproductive Rights Prof Blog (June 28, 2008),
available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/reproductive_rights/2008/06/
eighth-circui-1.html.
117
Post, supra note 4, at 954.
118
SOUTH DAKOTA T ASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at
25.
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wants the woman to hear.119 Pregnant women, given not the dry
science quoted above but rather the statement required by the
statute, will get a strong message from the state that the embryo or
fetus is morally equivalent to a child, that the pregnant woman is
already the ―mother‖ of that child, and that to proceed with the
abortion would be to murder her own child. 120 The Task Force
Report noted, ―For women who believe that they have consented to
the killing of a human being, the burden of guilt can be
unbearable.‖121 The informed consent statute thus becomes a selffulfilling prophesy. Women are persuaded of the state‘s moral
position, which leads those who have had abortions to suffer
―unbearable‖ guilt, and this mental anguish must now be conveyed
to women as part of the ―informed consent‖ process.
The South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion continued and
expanded the South Dakota legislature‘s efforts to transform moral
pronouncements about abortion into scientific statements. The
Task Force was established pursuant to a companion bill to the
―informed consent‖ statute.122 The bill‘s mandate was wideranging, directing the Task Force to study, among other issues,
―the practice of abortion since its legalization‖ and ―the societal,
economic, and ethical impact and effects of legalized abortion.‖123
The Task Force thus picked up the themes of the factfinding
conducted in support of the ―informed consent‖ law and laid the
groundwork for a later law banning abortion in South Dakota
entirely. 124 The legislature relied heavily upon the Task Force‘s
report in enacting the ban, which, in contrast to the ―informed

119
120
121

See Post, supra note 4, at 954–55.
See id. at 958.
SOUTH DAKOTA T ASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at

43.
122

Id. at 4; see also Siegel, supra note 8 (offering a detailed description and
analysis of the South Dakota Task Force Report).
123
HB 1233, 80th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2005); SOUTH DAKOTA
TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at 5.
124
HB 1215, 81st Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2006), See Kaiser Daily
Women‘s Health Policy Report, supra note 66 (reporting on the overturning of
South Dakota abortion ban by voter initiative); see also CASEY & CASSIDY,
supra note 8, at 8–10 (describing South Dakota strategy).
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consent‖ law, was intended to put the issue of overturning Roe
directly before the Supreme Court.125
Much of the Task Force‘s inquiry centered on whether a fetus
is a ―human being.‖ The Task Force elicited scientific testimony
describing the genetic structure of a human embryo, but its
question to witnesses opposing the ban exploited the ambiguity
between the superficially scientific question of genetics and the
moral question that obviously motivated the entire project.126
Confused, or suspicious of the Task Force‘s motives, these
witnesses refused to answer. The report notes, ―No credible
evidence was presented that challenged these scientific facts [that
the ‗human embryo and fetus is . . . a human being‘]. In fact, when
witnesses supporting abortion were asked when life begins, not one
would answer the question, stating that it would only be their
personal opinion.‖127
Although the Task Force deliberately melded scientific and
philosophical questions about ―life,‖ it ironically accused Planned
Parenthood of confusing the moral and scientific facts about when
life begins: ―We find that Planned Parenthood has confused the
objective biological fact that the procedure terminates the life of a
human being with the moral, or value judgment of what respect or
value should be placed upon the life of that human being.‖ 128 The
Task Force repeatedly denied intending to attach any moral
significance to its findings concerning the biological uniqueness of
a human embryo. 129 Yet the Task Force clearly intended that
125

See Evelyn Nieves, S.D. Abortion Bill Takes Aim at „Roe‟, WASH. POST
(Feb. 23, 2006); Casey & Cassidy, supra note 8, at 2.
126
See Post, supra note 4, at 957–58.
127
SOUTH DAKOTA T ASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at
12.
128
Id. at 17.
129
See, e.g., id. at 30. The Task Force parlayed other kinds of scientific
―facts‖ into ethical edicts as well. For example, the Report condemned abortions
in cases of rape or incest by quoting a pediatrician who testified that incest
seldom leads to ―deformities.‖ He then recounted the story of a ―very young
teenage mother‖ who was ―allegedly raped by her brother.‖ He lauded the
―young lady‘s courage to choose life for her newborn son.‖ Id. at 32–33. Still
other parts of the report were openly moral in nature. See, e.g., id. at 34
(―[A]bortion is unethical and immoral and our support of it as a society wounds
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women discern an ideological message in the supposedly
―scientific‖ information. 130
Apart from its shrewd conflation of morality and science, the
South Dakota Task Force‘s report dramatically demonstrates the
dangers of relying upon ―scientific‖ findings legislatures make in
the politically charged context of abortion. Although the Task
Force heard from witnesses on both sides of the issue, it cherrypicked those conclusions that fit its blatantly ideological agenda
and conclusorily dismissed the others as noncredible. The
witnesses the Task Force found the most credible were
ideologically opposed to abortion. For example, several of the
doctors it quoted were leaders in the anti-abortion movement.131
The Task Force‘s findings regarding women‘s alleged regret after
abortion were not based on credible evidence, as even the
conservative majority on the Supreme Court has acknowledged.132
The Task Force was also impressed with the testimony of
―pregnancy help center personnel.‖ 133 The reliance upon
―pregnancy help centers‖ seems innocuous, but in fact these
centers are formed to dissuade women from having abortions and
to perpetuate the myth that abortion causes post-traumatic stress
disorder.134 Improbably, the Task Force described the testimony of

all of us.‖).
130
See Post, supra note 4, at 957–58. The Task Force objected to the
unadorned, factual information abortion providers currently do provide patients.
This information includes the relative risks of childbirth and abortion, the
relative safety of abortion procedures, and the fact that there is no credible
evidence of long-term mental trauma from abortion. See SOUTH DAKOTA T ASK
FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at 40–41.
131
One doctor was Bernard Nathanson, a former pro-choice advocate who
became an activist against abortion rights and created the famous anti-abortion
film, ―The Silent Scream.‖ See SOUTH DAKOTA T ASK FORCE TO STUDY
ABORTION, supra note 107, at 11–12.
132
Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1634; see also Siegel, supra note 8, at 1689.
133
SOUTH DAKOTA T ASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at
19–21.
134
See Post, supra note 4, at 940–41; United States House Of
Representatives Committee On Government Reform — Minority Staff, Special
Investigations Division, False And Misleading Health Information Provided By
Federally Funded Pregnancy Resource Centers (July 2006) (prepared for Rep.
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these witnesses as ―particularly credible because they are free of
any conflict of interest‖ since they ―do not provide abortions.‖ 135
The Task Force‘s factfinding was so biased, in fact, that the
anti-abortion chair of the Task Force voted against its final
report.136 She later campaigned against the South Dakota abortion
ban, enacted on the heels of the Task Force‘s report, ―because, she
said, the Task Force had opposed motions to restrict the evidence it
accepted to ‗data that is consistent with current medical science
and based on the most rigorous and objective scientific
studies.‘‖137
C. Fetal Pain Laws
Fetal pain laws are a recently added component in several
states‘ abortion-specific ―informed consent‖ laws,138 although
some go further and require abortion providers to administer
anesthesia to the fetus if the woman consents. 139 Arkansas‘s law
requires that women seeking abortions at twenty weeks or later140
be offered printed materials about ―fetal pain.‖141 The materials
include the statement:
By twenty (20) weeks gestation, the unborn child has the
physical structures necessary to experience pain. There is
evidence that by twenty (20) weeks gestation unborn
children seek to evade certain stimuli in a manner that in an
infant or an adult would be interpreted to be a response to

Henry A. Waxman), available at http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1080.
135
SOUTH DAKOTA T ASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at
19.
136
Siegel, supra note 8, at 1681.
137
Id.
138
See generally Tobin, supra note 62 (discussing and analyzing fetal pain
laws in context of medical informed consent principles). Congress has also
considered a fetal pain measure, the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2006.
See id. at 141 n.169.
139
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1104 (2005).
140
In Georgia, women must be offered similar information regardless of
the stage of their pregnancy. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-9A-3, -4 (2006).
141
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-1103, -1105 (2005).
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pain. Anesthesia is routinely administered to unborn
children who are twenty (20) weeks gestational age or more
who undergo prenatal surgery. 142
The laws are presented as ensuring that women‘s decisions
regarding abortion are fully informed, as well as to give the
pregnant woman an opportunity to authorize or demand fetal
anesthesia. 143 Like the South Dakota ―informed consent‖ law, fetal
pain measures are presented as reflecting value-neutral, scientific
information. Arkansas‘s statute requires that ―the materials shall be
objective, nonjudgmental, and designed to convey only accurate
scientific information about the human fetus at the various
gestational ages.‖144
Far from reflecting concerns about fetal pain drawn from
reliable scientific research, however, fetal pain laws are designed
to make women feel troubled about ending the pregnancy by
making women think of their fetuses as morally equivalent to
babies. As a reporter observes, ―[I]t is clear that many of the antiabortion activists . . . have something more sweeping in mind [than
preventing fetal pain]: changing perceptions of the fetus.‖ 145 The
reporter further notes that ―[a]nother, perhaps intended, effect of
fetal-pain laws may be to make abortions harder to obtain,‖ since
many abortion clinics do not have the equipment or expertise to
administer fetal anesthesia. 146
A strategy memo from prominent anti-abortion attorney James
Bopp, Jr., confirms that the ultimate motive for the laws is not to
alleviate fetal pain but to turn the public against abortion. The
memo lists ―helpful legal changes‖ short of bans that will serve to
―keep the abortion issue alive and change hearts and minds . . .
translat[ing] into more disfavor for all abortions.‖147 The list
includes ―statute[s] patterned after the proposed Unborn Child Pain
Awareness Act‖ and ―statute[s] informing the woman seeking an

142
143
144
145
146
147

Id. § 20-16-1105(a)(1)(A).
See, e.g., id. §§ 20-16-1103, -1104, -1105.
Id. § 20-16-1105(a)(1)(B).
Annie Murphy Paul, The First Ache, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 10, 2008.
Id.
Bopp & Coleson, supra note 4, at 6.
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abortion that the unborn will experience pain.‖ 148 These statutes
are expected to ―change hearts and minds‖ because the notion that
a fetus can feel pain will make it seem more like a person:
In their use of pain to make the fetus seem more fully
human, anti-abortion forces draw on a deep tradition. Pain
has long played a special role in how society determines
who is like us or not like us (―us‖ being those with the
power to make and enforce such distinctions). The capacity
to feel pain has often been put forth as proof of a common
humanity. 149
Like the South Dakota ―informed consent‖ law, fetal pain laws
are designed to conceal their ulterior, ideological motives,
purporting instead to reflect only neutral, scientific facts. As a
commentator notes, ―The express purpose of [fetal pain measures]
is to diminish the suffering that a fetus must endure as part of a
post-20-week abortion. But the real purpose . . . is to discourage
women from choosing an abortion by stressing that a 20-week-old
fetus feels pain.‖150
Legislative factfinding on fetal pain is not just problematic
because it deceives the public about the legislation‘s true motives.
It is also substantively unreliable. Although the laws purport to
reflect scientific research showing that fetuses may experience pain
after a certain stage of pregnancy, the scientific community is
divided on this claim. Harper Jean Tobin argues that two out of
three of the most commonly mandated statements on fetal pain
―are questionable on the issue of truthfulness, and all are
misleading.‖151 Most women would likely infer from these
statements that fetuses can perceive pain and that anesthesia will
alleviate that pain. The women are told nothing of the conflicting
evidence concerning whether and when fetuses can perceive pain.

148

Id. at 9.
Paul, supra note 145.
150
Arthur Caplan, Abortion Politics Twist Facts in Fetal Pain Laws,
MSNBC.com (Nov. 30, 2005), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id
/10238840/ (The author is the director of the Center for Bioethics at the
University of Pennsylvania.).
151
Tobin, supra note 62, at 33–38.
149
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Nor are they told that even physicians who do not believe fetuses
perceive pain may nevertheless administer fetal anesthesia during
prenatal surgery in order to make the surgery easier (by
immobilizing the fetus and/or relaxing the uterus) and to improve
surgical outcomes (by reducing the production of fetal stress
hormones).152
As Tobin explains, the research on fetal pain is at best
inconclusive.153 Researchers and medical experts are sharply
divided on the issue of fetal pain and the advisability of fetal
anesthesia. Some believe that fetuses can perceive pain beginning
around twenty weeks of pregnancy and that, even if this fact is
uncertain, doctors should ―play it safe‖ by anesthetizing fetuses
before abortion. Others object that, in the presence of uncertainty,
a doctor ―playing it safe‖ should not anesthetize the fetus before
abortion, since such a procedure increases the woman‘s health
risks. 154
In a 1980 decision striking down an early fetal pain measure,
the Seventh Circuit refused to defer to the legislature‘s assertions
about the fetus‘s ability to perceive pain. Instead, it independently
reviewed the facts and concluded, ―The uncontroverted medical
testimony in the record at this stage describes this information as
‗medically meaningless, confusing, medically unjustified, and
contraindicated, causing cruel and harmful stress to patients.‘‖ 155
Fetal pain measures may still be unconstitutional today,
particularly if it can be proved that the information the legislature
requires is either false or misleading. 156 But this constitutional
argument can succeed only if the courts refuse to defer blindly to
legislative factfinding on fetal pain. 157
152

Id. at 143; Paul, supra note 145.
See Tobin, supra note 62, at 149.
154
Paul, supra note 145.
155
Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 784 (7th Cir. 1980).
156
See Tobin, supra note 62. But see Antony B. Kolenc, Easing Abortion‟s
Pain: Can Fetal Pain Legislation Survive the New Judicial Scrutiny of
Legislative Fact-Finding?, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 171, 228 (2005) (arguing
that fetal pain laws should be held constitutional).
157
But see Kolenc, supra note 156, at 218–19 (arguing that judicial
deference to legislative factfinding on fetal pain may be appropriate since ―facts
153
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D. “Partial-Birth Abortion”
Like ―informed consent‖ and fetal pain laws, ―partial-birth
abortion‖ bans vividly demonstrate the dangers of judicial
deference to legislative factfinding on abortion. The bans were
conceived and promoted by advocates and politicians who oppose
all abortions.158 Although they purported to be about a particular
abortion procedure, they were intended to force the public to
confront the details of abortion procedures, and thereby to turn
public sentiment against abortion. The campaign to prohibit
―partial-birth abortion‖ was thus part of an assiduously planned
strategy to muster public outrage over abortion more generally. 159
The campaign to ban so-called ―partial-birth abortion‖ began as
a collaboration between a National Right to Life Committee
(―NRLC‖) lobbyist, Douglas Johnson, and Charles Canady, a
right-wing Republican congressman from Florida. The antiabortion-rights movement had failed to see Roe v. Wade
overturned in the 1980s and early 1990s. In response to its decisive
defeat in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the movement shifted its
focus to passing incremental restrictions that would gradually
undermine the core right to abortion. When Dr. Martin Haskell
presented a lecture at a national conference of abortion providers,
describing a new variation on the most common method of secondand third-trimester surgical abortions, Johnson and Canady seized
upon it. They believed that the method was a perfect vehicle to
provoke moral outrage at abortion generally. A description of this
procedure would arrest the public‘s attention, in part because it
was not so disturbing as to cause the public to avert its eyes.
Johnson and Canady coined a deliberately incendiary term for
regarding fetal pain are best discovered using the processes normally seen as
legislative strengths -- long investigations, evolving medical evidence, and a
building of institutional expertise in a complex area‖).
158
Brief for NARAL Foundation, et al. as Amici Curiae supporting
Respondents, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
159
See Cynthia Gorney, Gambling with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think
They Have Everything To Lose, HARPER‘S MAG., Nov. 1, 2004, at 33; Nadine
Strossen & Caitlin Borgmann, The Carefully Orchestrated Campaign, 3 NEXUS
3, 5–6 (1998).
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Haskell‘s method, ―partial-birth abortion.‖ Pursuant to Johnson
and Canady‘s plan, the NRLC circulated model legislation, along
with strategic advice, to all of its state chapters. The state and
federal bans that followed were thus a product of this carefully
orchestrated public relations campaign. 160
As part of the campaign, line drawings purporting to depict the
targeted procedure were developed specifically to make the fetus
appear as a newborn infant. As a recent anti-abortion strategy
memo acknowledged, ―The PBA drawings set before the public
showed a developed baby, capable of life outside the womb, within
inches of birth, being slaughtered by a stab in the skull and the
suctioning of its brains. People were shocked out of their lethargy
and flawed beliefs.‖161 In fact, the intact D&E162 variant of D&E
abortions is often used in the second trimester of pregnancy, well
before fetal viability. 163
The point of the drawings, however, was not to engage in a
medically accurate public dialog about abortion procedures.
Rather, it was to fuse abortion and infanticide in the public
consciousness. In a memo the NRLC distributed to its state
chapters nationwide,164 Johnson acknowledged the bans‘ true
purpose. Far from reflecting a considered, public response to a
medically questionable procedure, the bans were intended to draw
pro-choice advocates into discussions centering on how abortions
are performed. The memo advised:
When someone attacks the definition as ―unclear‖ or as
overly sweeping, simply keep reading the definition and
asking, ―What part of this is not clear? Please describe in
detail the procedures that you want to do that you believe
160

Strossen & Borgmann, supra note 159, at 26 (footnotes omitted).
Bopp & Coleson, supra note 4, at 5. The Supreme Court adopted this
depiction of the procedure as performed upon full-term babies. See supra text
accompanying notes 68–69.
162
―D&E‖ stands for ―dilation and evacuation,‖ the most common method
of abortion after the first trimester of pregnancy. See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 924.
―Intact D&E‖ is a variant of this procedure and is also sometimes referred to as
―D&X.‖ Id. at 927.
163
See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 4, at 5.
164
See Amicus Brief of NARAL Foundation, et. al., supra note 158.
161
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would be banned by this definition.‖ Generally, the proabortion side quickly drops this discussion, as it serves
mainly to focus the discussion on the grisly mechanics of
late term abortions.165
In contrast to recent ―informed consent‖ laws and fetal pain
measures, ―partial-birth abortion‖ bans were openly moral in
purpose.166 But the real moral purpose, to advance a future ban on
all abortions, was not legally acceptable. Nor were the bans
reasonably related to that goal, since they purported to ban only a
single procedure. ―Partial-birth abortion‖ thus became a decoy in
the battle to win over the public. Advocates narrowed the moral
goals, allegedly aiming only to protect the dignity of the fetus and
to promote the integrity of the medical profession.167 Yet even
these goals could be pursued only insofar as the bans did not
unduly burden the right to abortion. 168 If the bans endangered
women‘s health, they would impose an undue burden.169 In order
to prove that the bans could be constitutional even without a health
exception, legislatures had to appeal to medical ―facts.‖ They had
to demonstrate that the targeted method was medically
questionable (i.e. not widely accepted by the medical
establishment) and of little to no medical benefit, or even
affirmatively dangerous, to women. 170
Anti-abortion advocates therefore portrayed the procedure as a
rogue method that was invented more for physicians‘ convenience
than women‘s safety and wellbeing. 171 They suggested that a fetus
165

Id. at 17 (quoting memo) (emphasis added).
See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV
2000); Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1633.
167
See 18 U.S.C. § 1531; Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 930–31.
168
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 837.
169
See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 931; Borgmann, supra note 44.
170
Legislatures did not attempt to defend the premise regarding fetal
dignity, probably because a comparison to other procedures would inevitably
have failed to show why intact D&E was any more of an affront to fetal dignity
than other available procedures.
171
See, e.g., Illinois Right to Life Committee, Partial Birth Abortion Ban:
In
Depth,
http://www.illinoisrighttolife.org/PartialBirthAbortionBan.htm
(―[T]he procedure itself is dangerous and solely for the convenience of
166

BORGMANN

50

4/27/2009 6:56 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

aborted through this procedure could be born and could survive if
only the physician did not kill it first. 172 They gave dramatic
accounts of risks the procedure allegedly carried. 173 They claimed
that banning the procedure would not harm women because
alternative methods were just as safe or safer. 174 Ultimately, none
of this ―factfinding‖ had anything to do with the real impetus for
the bans. As Judge Richard A. Posner wrote, dissenting from a
Seventh Circuit decision addressing two state ―partial-birth
abortion‖ bans:
The statutes do not seek to protect the lives or health of
pregnant women, or of anybody else. . . . Any general
health regulation is likely to hurt a few people. But as
banning ―partial birth‖ abortions is not intended to improve
the health of women (or anyone, for that matter), it cannot
be defended as a health regulation.175
Moreover, if the legislature were concerned about women‘s
health, Posner pointed out, it is unclear why it failed to include a
health exception:
Tomorrow, studies may show that, yes, there indeed are
cases where a ―partial birth‖ abortion is necessary to
protect the mother‘s health, as many physicians believe.
Tomorrow, then, these two statutes may be unconstitutional
even by the lights of the majority opinion. Why would a
state risk the early obsolescence of its statute by making it
wholly dependent on ever-changing medical opinion, when
to avoid this risk it need only have excepted those ―partial
birth‖ abortions, if any, that are necessary to protect the
woman‘s health?176
The NRLC exercised remarkable influence over the legislative

abortionists.‖).
172
See Bopp & Colseson, supra note 4, at 5.
173
See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 153 (findings
section).
174
See id.
175
Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 878 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
176
Id. at 880.
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process of enacting the ―partial-birth abortion‖ bans, drafting,
promoting, and lobbying vigorously for their passage. 177 The
advocacy group controlled how the bans were worded,
―instruct[ing] legislatures in State after State on how to resist
limiting or clarifying the scope of so-called ‗partial-birth‘ abortion
legislation.‖178 The strategy was so successful that ―all the States
that enacted such legislation in 1996, 1997, or 1998 adopted
language substantially similar to the model legislation espoused by
the NRLC.‖179 Judge Posner lamented the partisan quality of the
legislative response:
The wave of ―partial birth‖ abortion statutes that broke over
the nation after a description of the D & X procedure was
publicized does not exhibit the legislative process at its
best, whatever one thinks of abortion rights. Whipped up
by activists who wanted to dramatize the ugliness of
abortions and deter physicians from performing them, the
public support for the laws was also based . . . on sheer
ignorance of the medical realities of late-term abortion.180
Indeed, the state and federal legislative hearings on the
―partial-birth abortion‖ bans more closely resembled boisterous
town hall meetings more sober, thoughtful inquiries into the
relevant facts. Testimony often included wild accusations and
virulent condemnations of abortion generally (comparing it to the
Holocaust, for example). 181 Witnesses typically included members
of advocacy groups and interested citizens. There was little
testimony from doctors. In Arizona, the witnesses who testified in
a 1997 hearing on H.B. 2191 were typical of those who appeared
in other state legislatures.182 They included a staff member of the
Arizona Catholic Conference, a lawyer and another staff member
from Planned Parenthood, the Executive Director of Arizona Right

177

Brief of NARAL Found. et. al., as Amicus Curiae supporting
Respondent, supra note 158, at 17.
178
Id. at 18.
179
Id.
180
Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 880 (citations omitted).
181
See Borgmann, supra note 11, at __.
182
See, e.g., id. at __ (describing testimony before Alaska Legislature).
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to Choose, a woman who described her own tragic pregnancy that
necessitated an intact D&E, two representatives of the Center for
Arizona Policy (a conservative advocacy group), a Reverend of the
Church of Christ, and two interested citizens. In addition, fifteen
members of the public ―want[ed] to have their opposition to H.B.
2191 noted for the record but [did] not wish to speak.‖183
Allowing interested members of the public to express their
views on a controversial topic may serve a worthy purpose in a
legislative hearing. But it is not an effective mechanism for
educating the legislature about the facts. Yet the state legislatures
seemed to rely on the testimony of non-medically-trained
advocates for the relevant medical information. For example, a
representative of Arizona Right to Life testified that the ban‘s
description of the targeted procedure did not encompass other
procedures and ―questioned the idea of this method being a lifesaving procedure.‖184 In Alaska,
[c]ommittee members directed many medically related
questions to one of the Alaska Civil Liberties Union
representatives, who repeatedly reminded the committee
that she was not a physician. The sole doctor to testify was
not able to speak to all of the relevant medical issues, since
he did not himself provide abortions. The lone citizen to
testify against the ban asked the committee whether any
doctors in Alaska performed the targeted procedure, but
none could answer that question. 185
Congress‘s hearings were not much better. In fact, fifty-two
members of Congress signed onto an amicus brief that attacked
Congress‘s factfinding on the federal ―Partial Birth Abortion Ban
Act.‖ The brief noted that detailed congressional ―findings‖ were
inserted into the new version of the ban before any hearings on the
183

Partial-birth Abortions; Prohibition: Hearing on H.B. 2191 Before the
Gov‟t Reform & States‟ Rights Comm., 43rd Leg., 1st Sess. 8 (Ariz. 1997) (on
file with author).
184
Id. at 7. This witness also submitted a transcript of the congressional
testimony of Brenda Pratt Shafer, a nurse who claimed to have worked for Dr.
Haskell and to have witnessed him performing three intact D&E procedures and
who described in detail what she had allegedly seen.
185
Borgmann, supra note 11, at __.
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new version were held, and that ―[t]he Congressional hearing that
followed the drafting of the Findings was politically biased and
transparently partisan, calculated to highlight testimony from
supporters of the ban.‖186
In contrast, the court proceedings on the state and federal bans
played out very differently. ―Free of the advocacy-oriented rhetoric
that punctuated the [legislative] hearings, the parties enjoyed the
comparative luxury of a fair process and the court‘s serious
attention to the factual issues.‖187 When courts declined to defer to
legislative factfinding, as virtually every court did until the
Supreme Court‘s decision in Carhart II, they invalidated the bans
with near uniformity. 188 In Carhart II, it was the Court‘s solicitude
toward Congress‘s judgments regarding the health effects of the
federal ban that enabled the Court to uphold it.189
CONCLUSION
Legislative factfinding will inevitably be a mixture of morality
and science. The normative context in which legislative decisionmaking occurs shapes the very questions that are asked and the
way those questions are answered. 190 This, however, means that
courts must approach legislative factfinding cautiously and
skeptically. To the extent an issue like abortion does raise
empirical scientific questions (Can we know whether a fetus is able
to perceive pain? Do abortions cause post-traumatic stress
186

See Brief of 52 Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 10–11, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed‘n of Am., 127 S.
Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos 05-1382, 05-380).
187
Borgmann, supra note 15, at __. For a more detailed comparison
between court proceedings and federal and state legislative hearings on ―partialbirth abortion‖ bans, see id. at 25–33.
188
See ACLU, Abortion Bans: In the States (2006) (summarizing court
rulings on ―partial-birth abortion‖ bans), http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/
abortion/12544res20051007.html.
189
See supra text accompanying notes 46–68.
190
See FAIGMAN, supra note 14, at 178–81; Rebecca Bratspies, The Role of
Trust in Regulatory Systems (draft on file with author); see also Suzanne
Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1957
(2006) (making a similar point regarding judging).
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disorder?), courts should conduct an independent review to ensure
that the facts are driving the moral conclusions and policy choices,
and not the other way around. A court may defer to a legislature‘s
policy decision to respond to a given set of facts in a particular
way (assuming that to do so does not violate constitutional rights).
But if it turns out that the facts are not as the legislature portrayed
them, then the policy decision itself is called into question.
Sometimes moral influences are subconscious. But often they are
not, and yet they are unacknowledged or even obscured for
political reasons. This undermines healthy decision-making at both
the legislative and judicial levels.191 While it would be impossible
completely to segregate science and morality in factfinding, the
integrity of the decision-making process will only be improved if
ideological influences are explicitly acknowledged.192
In the abortion context, recent decisions by the Supreme Court
in Carhart II and the Eighth Circuit in Rounds have taken the
opposite approach. Faced with legislation and legislative
factfinding clearly orchestrated so as to conceal the true
ideological impetus for the laws, each court rewarded this
obfuscation. 193 Each accepted questionable ―scientific‖ conclusions
and then found that these conclusions justified the laws. In Carhart
II, the Court admitted that Congress‘s factfinding was shoddy, yet
favored it over the thorough factfinding of both district courts
below. 194 Even more remarkably, it appeared to send a message to
state legislatures, encouraging them to continue their biased
factfinding on abortion, and to lower courts, urging them to
defer.195 In its en banc opinion in Rounds, the Eighth Circuit
191

Cf. Goldberg, supra note 190 (arguing that greater judicial candor
regarding the normative underpinning of court decisions will improve theories
of judicial review).
192
See id.
193
I assume that the legislators knew of or were complicit in the long-term
plan underlying the South Dakota ―informed consent‖ laws and the ―partial birth
abortion‖ bans. But if they were misled by anti-abortion advocates, this only
further supports the need for searching judicial review of the facts to ensure that
the influence of lobbyists has not tainted the factfinding process.
194
See supra text accompanying notes 48–53.
195
See supra text accompanying notes 57–59.
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accepted the invitation wholeheartedly, participating in the South
Dakota legislature‘s farce.196
It is one thing for legislatures to engage in biased factfinding; it
is quite another for courts to repeat the phenomenon. We may be
willing to accept that politically influenced legislators will engage
in advocacy-oriented ―factfinding.‖ But we can tolerate this system
only so long as we can rely on the federal courts to protect against
its harmful effects.197 Blind judicial deference sidesteps this critical
role of the courts, reproducing the legislatures‘ disingenuous
factfinding at the Supreme Court level and embedding it into the
Court‘s abortion jurisprudence. This is especially troubling
inasmuch as the Court, once it finds certain medical facts, tends to
view those as fixed by stare decisis. 198 Far worse than a
legislature‘s enactment of a misinformed statute, which can always
be repealed or judicially invalidated, judicial deference leads to
long-term, legal recognition of politically motivated, unreliable
factual claims.
There is another troubling aspect to the courts‘ acceptance of
legislatures‘ attempts to repackage ideologically motivated
restrictions as grounded in science and public health. Jessie Hill
has argued that the Court‘s jurisprudence on medical decisionmaking has proceeded on two separate tracks—a public health
model and an autonomy model. 199 The autonomy model is more
protective of the right to make medical treatment decisions, and
traditionally the Court has analyzed abortion regulations under this
paradigm. 200 To the extent that legislatures cast abortion regulation
as less about morality and more about science and medicine, the
Court may find reason to shift more to the public health model,
under which health regulations are subject only to rational basis
review. 201 There were already hints of this in Carhart II, where the
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198
199
200
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review).

See supra text accompanying notes 102–11.
Borgmann, supra note 11, at __.
See FAIGMAN, supra note 14; Hill, supra note 21.
Hill, supra note 21, at 294.
Id.
See id. (stating that public health regulations are subject to rational basis
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Court combined the undue burden standard with language echoing
rational basis review.202
When legislatures jeopardize important individual rights,
courts have a duty to step in to implement the norms of justice. 203
This ―profound obligation‖204 carries with it a responsibility for
factual and scientific truth in implementing those norms. In the
context of abortion restrictions, the Supreme Court has failed on
both of these fronts. In Casey, the Court invited legislatures to base
abortion restrictions upon moral norms that directly conflict with
the right to abortion. Yet it refused to acknowledge this conflict
and the extent to which it undermined the fundamental right
declared in Roe. The Court‘s prevaricating confused the legislative
landscape on abortion, prompting legislatures to pass laws based
on moral opposition to abortion while disingenuously presenting
them as scientifically based. In Carhart II, the Court made plain its
willingness to tolerate this legislative disregard for factual and
scientific truth in regulating abortion. In so doing, it shirked its
primary constitutional responsibility to protect individual rights
and promote justice, as well as its subsidiary responsibility for
truth.

202

See Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1633. Professor Hill describes Carhart II as
suggesting a possible middle ground between the public health and autonomy
models. See Hill, supra note 21, at 342.
203
See supra note 23.
204
CHOPER, supra note 25, at 78.

